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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------
----------
----------
DARRELL J. DIDERICKSEN & 
SONS, INC., a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MAGNA WATER & SEWER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, 
vs. 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
and 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Appellant, 
TE}WLETON. LINKE & ASSOCIATES, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
CASE NO. 1612 9 
------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
------------------------------------------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff-respondent, 
Darrell J. Didericksen and Sons, Inc., (hereinafter plaintiff) 
to recover damages for breach of contract by defendant-
appellant, Magna Water & Sewer Improvement District, (hereinafter 
Magna) and to recover $29,281.00 due under the contract between 
plaintiff and Magna. 
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Magna counterclaimed against plaintiff and filed Third-
Party actions against Utah State Department of Transportation, 
(hereinafter DOT) and Temnleton, Linke ~' Associates, (hereinafter 
Templeton) on theories of contractual indemnity and negligence 
respectively 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable J. E. Banks 
of the Third Judicial District Court who awarded plaintiff a 
money judgment in the sum of $24, 969. 00 plus interest, said suTTI 
being the contract price for the labor and material provided 
by plaintiff as of the date of termination less applicable discounts. 
The court ruled that Magna breached the contract and dismissed 
Magna' s counterclairr, but also held plaintiff and failed to 
establish with certainty its anticipated profits. DOT was held 
to be liable to Magna for the ultimate judgment of the court and 
Magna stipulated that its claim against Templeton could be dis-
missed since the court had not allowed any damages for breach 
except the contract price of services and materials actually 
rendered. The trial court denied Magna's motion for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent. seeks to have the judgment of the 
lower court affirmed and costs awarded to the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case rises from a construction contract between 
Magna and plaintiff for the relocation of a sewer line along 2400 sou:· 
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in 'fa~a, Utah. In preparation for bidding on the contract, 
plaintiff's personnel insoected the construction site and found 
it to be mostly open field with substantial ground water through-
out the western oortion which furt11er investigation showed to 
be mainlv irrigation run-off (Record: 535, 536). The bid 
plans showed a freeway which was to be built, but all freewav 
drawings were marked "future construction". The term "future 
construction" means, for construction after the contract in which 
the hid was to be rendered (R. 678). The contract made time 
of the essence, called for progress payments to be made by 
Magna by the 15th of the month for work done in the prior 
month, and required a written change order before payment could 
be made for any changed construction (Exh. 1-P: general condi-
tions, Paragraphs 18,19,22, and 25 (a)). The contract further 
required that constructionbe completed within 180 days of the 
beginning of construction (Exh. 1-P: information for bidders, 
Item 9). 
Plaintiff was the low bidder and signed the contract 
on the 9th day of September 1975. On the 12th day of September, 
1975, Darrell J. Didericksen, president of plaintiff, noticed 
that construction vehicles had pulled on to the area of the 
sewer relocation project (R. 537). Aporoxirntely three days 
later at the preconstruction conference, plaintiff's oersonnel 
were told that W. w. Clvde would be constructing the freeway 
at the same time as plaintiff's relocation contract would be 
going forward. Prior to the signing of the contract, Magna had 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been notified that W. W. Clvde would be undertaking 
construction, 
but had failed to make anv indication of that fact in its bid 
drawings or to otherwise notifv plaintiff (Exh. 17-P, R. Fi77, 
6 79). 
At the preconstruction conference, plaintiff was 
requested to begin construction in the middle of the project 
to avoid conflict with the freeway contractor. Plaintiff's 
personnel indicated they would begin in the middle if a change 
order were issued to cover the cost of building a pad throu~h 
the ground water and to cover the additional costs of starting 
at the middle rather than the low end of the sewer line (R. 538, 
539, 540, 541), Jim Didericksen, plaintiff's vice-president, 
Pointed out that the plaintiff had contemnlated constructinv, 
the west end of the project in mid-winter when there was no 
irrigation and the remaining ground water would be frozen 
and therefore had not included the cost of a construction pad 
in this bid. Beginning in the middle of the project would also 
impose upon plaintiff the burden of pumping substantial water, 
whereas beginning construction at the low end of the seuer line 
would not (R. 617). In the course of several discussions of the 
topic, Robert Emerson, project engineer for Temnleton (Magna's 
engineers), indicated to plaintiff that he would attemot to obtain 
a change order and as a result of said conversations, plaintiff 
made prenarations to begin in the middle of the project (R. 541. 
542. 831). 
On the 8th day of October 1975, Jim Didericksen was 
told by Robert Emerson that Mr. Emerson had redesigned the project 
-4-
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to avoid conflicts with the highway contractor and that 
nlaintiff could, "proceed with the project as he had originally 
bid it. In other words, he could start at the location he had 
planned'' (R. 831). Plaintiff began work on the 15th of October 
at the east end where the sewer trench was lowest (R. 523). 
On the 7th day of November 1975, plaintiff submitted 
its estimate of $22, 744.32 for work done in October, oursuant 
to oral instructions received by plaintiff at the preconstruction 
conference to the effect that estimates submitted bv the 12th 
would be paid by the 15th (R. 523). The estimate was approved 
for payment by Templeton (Exh. 3-P). No payment was made by 
Magna on November 15th. Plaintiff submitted another estimate 
of S54,386.46 on the 8th day of December for work done in 
November which was also aporoved. Magna made no payment on 
the 15t~ of December (R. 525, 526). 
Construction on the freeway had progressed during 
October and November so that many obstacles were now placed 
in the line of the sewer relocation project including excava-
tions, drainage trenches, and fences (Exh. 13-P, 16-P: R. 546-
550). The attempt by Templeton to redraw the sewer line had 
not solved the oroblem (R. 525). Templeton conceded there 
was a change in condition and aonlied for authorization to issue 
a change order (Exh. 16-P). On December 22nd plaintiff notified 
Magna that it was about to reach a point where no further 
construction could be undertaken under the original drawings 
and that if a change order was not issued, and the delinquent 
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progress payments made, plaintiff would pull off the job (Exh. 6-P) 
No change order was issued and no vavment made. Pl aintiff ceased 
work on the 27th of December, 1975. 
Magna finallv made pavment on t'1e plaintiff's first two 
estimates in January and February of 1976 but has not vaid plain-
tiff for the construction •vork comoleted in Decer:iber of 1975 nor 
for the 10'7o of the October and November work which was retained. 
amounting to a total of aooroximtelv $24,000 after discounts, 
as reflected in the judgment rendered by the trial court. Also 
after the plaintiff had ceased work, Magna negotiated for and 
finally obtained easements which allowed Magna to redesign 
the sewer line to avoid many of the conflicts with the highwav 
construction. In August of 1976 Magna let a contract to J. Tuft 
to construct the newly aligned sewer (Exh. 9-D, Apoendix A. R. 751) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT Is FINDING THAT cmlSTRUCTION OF 
THE SEWER RELOCATION PROJECT COULD NOT BE 
COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND 
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE CONTRACT IS SUPPORTED 
cases, 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
It is established law in contract cases, as in other 
that the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed 
on appeal if there is "a reasonable basis in evidence to suooort 
it". Holman v. Sorensen, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976); Charleton v. 
P 2d 176 (1961) Two exhibits in the Hackett, 11 U.2d 339. 360 . . 
evidence established clearly that the court's finding of a sub-
stantial change in the construction oroject was correct and was 
d The first is Exhibit 16-P which is supported by the evi ence. 
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a letter from Templeton to DOT conceding that there was a change 
in circumstances in the sewer relocation oroject and requesting 
oermission of DOT to issue a change order to the plaintiff. 
The second item of evidence is defendant's own 
exhibit (Exh. 9-D, Aopendix A) which shows a portion of the 
sewer relocation oroject as bid and as constructed (R. 534). 
The point where the sewer line as constructed (black line) 
diverges from the line as bid (red line) is the verv point 
where plaintiff ceased work (R. 560). The project had changed 
so substantially that the defendants themselves elected not 
to construct the sewer line along the line of the original 
bid but along a new line which avoided many of the obstacles 
with which plaintiff was faced on the 27th of December 1975 
when plaintiff discontinued work on the project. The line 
along which Magna ultimately hired Mr. Tuft to construct the 
sewer was not available to the plaintiff in December of 1975 
since easements for said alignment were not acquired by 
defendants until at least January of 1976 (R. 833, 834), and 
probably not until June of 1976 (R. 559, 665, 666). 
In December of 1975 nlaintiff's only options were 
either to continue constructing along the line of the original 
bid or to shut down. The substantial nature of the obstacles 
Placed along the line of the original bid are outlined in 
Exhibit 6-P and described in the testimony of James Didericksen 
(R ) These obtacles included newly excavated . 559, R. 546-552 . 
Piles of dirt, fences, and drainage canals. (See Exh. 13-P 
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and 14-P). All of these changes constituted a verv different 
construction project than the one plaintiff's agents had contem-
plated when thev prepared their bid after observing the construc-
tion site, an open field. 
Nor is the change mitigated bv the fact that 
plaintiff's bid was in unit prices. What constitutes a reasonable 
bid per linear foot of sewer trench for an open field is not 
reasonable when the contractor only has access to one side 
of trench for stacking the excavated material and hauling in 
select backfill or when the excavation passes through or along 
newly constructed ditches or embankments where shoring, Dumping, 
and restoration must take place. 
The court's conclusion t'1at the responsibilitv 
for the change in conditions falls upon Magna, is also sunported 
by the evidence. Magna had been notified t~at the freewav 
construction would be underway during the term of the sewer relo-
cation project, but had failed to reflect that in the bid sneci-
fications or to notify plaintiff of the fact in any manner (Exh. 
17-P, R. 677, 678, 679). The drawings showing freewav construe-
tion were clearly labeled "future construction". Mr. Keith Slater, 
an engineer and ulaintiff' s expert witness, testified that the 
term "future constru;,,,tion" meant, to be constructed outside of 
the time frame of the sewer relocation contract (Exh. 8-P, R. 678) · 
All the evidence before the trial court shows the plaintiff first 
. f t · 0 f cont'.: learned of the imuending freewav construction a ter execu ion 
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Contrary to the allegations in appellants' brief, 
plaintiff was not put to the election of beginning construc-
tion in the middle of the relocation project. Plaintiff had 
indicated it would begin construction in the middle of the 
project if a Change Order were issued by Magn~ and Magna's 
agent, Robert Emerson, the project manager, had agreed to 
" ... check '"i th the state and determine what could be done in 
this area" (R. 831). Robert Emerson then reports the follow-
ing telephone conversation: 
On the 8th of October I had a telephone 
conversation with Jim Didericksen wherein 
I told him to proceed with the project 
as he had originally bid it. In other 
words, start at the location he had 
planned. I also indicated to him that 
we had realigned the sewer at the box 
culvert West of 8400 West to eliminate 
a conflict in location there and I felt 
that because we had a unit price contract 
that he could nroceed in that area without 
any Change Orders (R.831). 
Plaintiff, in all good faith, began construction 
as instructed. The fact that Robert EI'lerson's realignment did 
not alleviate the problem is shown not only in the testimony 
of Jim Didericksen to that effect (R. 552, 553), but by 
Templeton's own judgment that as of the 21st of November a 
change condition existed (Exh. 16-P). Upon learning that the 
problem had not been solved, plaintiff again requested a 
Change Order to continue construction. On the 22nd of December 
plaintiff notified defendant that plaintiff would no longer 
be able to continue construction unless a Change Order was 
-9-
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issued (Exh. 6-P). 
Jim Didericksen testified that as of the 27th of 
December 1975 plaintiff had reached the · point in construction 
where it could no longer continue under the original bid docu-
ment, having reached the area of freewav construction and having 
received no Chanze Order. Plaintiff therefore terminated work. 
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's Finding of Fact 
that: 
Because of the highwav construction, construc-
tion of the sewer relocation project could not 
be completed in accordance with the terms and 
specifications of the contract entered into 
between plaintiff and defendant. (R. 303) 
The evidence also supports the court's conclusion that Magna is 
the party responsible for the changed condition. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT MAGNA BREACHED THE 
CONTRACT BY FAILING TO MAKE TIMELY PROGRESS PAYMENTS 
AND THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAIVE MAGNA'S BREACH ARE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The contract between plaintiff was drawn bv Magna or 
Magna's agents and makes time of the essence (Exh. 1-P: general 
conditions Paragraph 19) . The contract requires Magna to make 
progress payments by the 15th of each month as follows: 
Not later than the 15th day of each calendar 
month the o'Wt'ler shall make a progress payment 
to the contractor on the basis of a duly certi-
fied and approved estimate performed during the 
preceding calendar month under this cont~act: .. 
provided, that the contractor.shall submit his 
estimate not later than the first day of the 
month ... (Exh. 1-P: general conditions Para-
graph 25 (a)). 
As appellant's brief points out plaintiff was told by 
Magna's agents at the preconstruction conference that estimates 
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submitted by the 12th would be oaid by the 15th. Plaintiff 
submitted an estimate of $22,744.32 for the work done in 
October on the 7th of November which estimate was approved by 
Templeton and submitted another estimate of $54,386.46 on 
the 8th day of December for work done in November which esti-
mate was also approved for payment by Templeton (Exh. 3-P, 
4-P, R. 523, and 526). 
The trial court did not find Magna's failure to make 
payment on the 15th of November to be a breach of the contract 
since the estimate had not been submitted by the 1st of November. 
The court however did find that Magna's failure to make a 
payment of $22, 744.32 on the 15th day of December was a breach 
of t11e contract which iustified plaintiff's termination of 
work on the 27th of December (Findings of Fact and Conclusion 
of Law: Conclusion II (3), R. 306). 
Where time is of the essence of the contract. failure 
to oerform within the time stipulated is sufficient breach 
to allow the non-breaching party to consider the contract at 
an end. Universitv Properties Inc. v. Moss, 388 P.2d 543 
(Wash 1964), 17A C.J.S. Contracts 422 (1) Page 520. 
In the case of Wagstaff v. Remco, 540 P.2d 931 
(Utah 1975) there is no indication of a contract provision 
making time of the essence. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
sustained the trial court's finding that a one month delay in 
the payment of a progress payment justified the contractor 
in pulling off the job. Even applying the standard of Remco to 
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this case the trial court's finding is sustained by the evi-
dence. In light of the representations made by Magna's agent 
at the pre-construction conference as to the d f b ate or su mitting 
estimates for payment. plaintiff reasonably anticipated receiving 
payments by the 15th of December totallv in excess of $77,100.00 
The contract requires the contractor pay for all materials and 
transportation services bv the 20th day of the mont~ following 
the month in which the service or materials were provided (Exh. 
1-P: general conditions Paragranh 27). The court made a specific 
finding that in preparing plaintiff's bid, plaintiff had negotiated 
agreements with plaintiff's material suppliers which allowed 
plaintiff a discount for prompt payment for materials and plaintiff 
had relied on these discounts in calculating Plaintiff's bid 
(Findings of Fact IX, R. 304). 
The trial court made a specific finding that plaintiff 
had not waived its right to receive payment in full bv accepting 
the $77,000 payment made by Magna after termination of work 
by plaintiff. (Finding of Fact XVI, R. 305). In contract matters 
such as this, the findings and judgment of the trial court enjoy 
a presumption of validity and appellant has the burden of showin~ 
from the record that the trial court erred in its finding. ~g_. 
Tolman Construction Company Inc. v. Myton Water Association, 563 
P.2d 780 (Utah 1977). 
Of Jl·m Di"deri"cksen shows that plaintiff The testimony 
learned for the first time at the pre-construction conference 
. t 
that Magna was obtaining the funds for the construction pro] ec 
d anv t l·me. however. of any from the State. No mention was ma e at _ 
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delav in pavments (R. 621). In fact, at the pre-construction 
conference Magna's agent affirmed that if estimates where 
submitted by the 12th payments would be made by the 15th. 
There is no evidence in the record of any agreement by plaintiff 
or plaintiff's personnel to allow Magna any delay in the making 
of installment Pavments. In its notice of breach and demand 
for cure, dated December 22nd, plaintiff specifically demanded 
that Magna oay the progress payments due (Exh. 6-P). Magna 
paid the $77,000.00 of installments after termination of the 
contract without negotiation or stioulation from plaintiff. 
All of the above sustains the finding of the trial court that 
there was no waiver of ~agna's breach. 
Nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply to the 
facts of this case. There is neither evidence that the nlaintiff 
acquiesced in Magna's late payment, nor is there evidence that 
any conduct of Magna whatsoever was motivated by Magna's reliance 
upon anv alleged acauiescence on the part of the plaintiff. 
Exhibit 6-P clearly shows that plaintiff asserted its claim 
for progress payments during the period in which the contract 
was in force and gave Magna an opportunity to cure its breach 
which Magna refused to do. The estoppel argument was made 
to trial court which responded as follows: 
(Mr. Wright) We think, your Honor, that he 
has waived that provision with respect to 
payment on the 15th. 
THE COURT: Well, let me put it to you this way. 
MR. WRIGHT: And that he's estopped. 
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THE COURT: Looking at it most favorably 
as I recall, in order to make--get that ' 
p~yment by the 15th, they had to be sub-
mitted by the 1st. And according to 
my notes, his first estimate was submitted 
on November the 7th. So, the strict inter-
pretation of the contract, he couldn't 
expect to be Paid until the 15th of Decem-
ber. Where does that put you in your 
position? 
MR. WRIGHT: Well, the position t>i.at it 
Puts us in is that he wasn't paid on the 
15th. 
THE COURT: He wasn't paid. He can quit 
within twelve days, and he quit within 
twelve days of when he was entitled to be 
paid under the terms of the contract. 
Your motion's denied. (R. 699) 
That finding is supported by the evidence. 
POINT III: THE RECORD CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLANT, MAGNA, 
BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY FAILING TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF 
WITH WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION TO UNDERTAKE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE SEWER RELOCATION 
PROJECT. 
Again, in Point Three. appellant appears to be attack-
ing a finding of fact of the trial court upon which substantial 
evidence was presented at trial and the court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff. The trial court found that 
and 
Changes in construction and the necessity for 
coordination, which resulted because of the 
highway construction. were ~ub~tan~ial a~d . , 
were not anticipated by plaintiff in plaintiff s 
bid. 
Plaintiff requested permission ~rom d:fendant to 
undertake the changed construction which defen-
dant failed to grant. 
-14-
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and concluded therefrom that defendant, Magna, breached the 
contract: 
by failing to provide plaintiff with written 
authorization to undertake construction of 
the substantial changes in the sewer reloca-
tion proj7ct whi~h :esulted from the highway 
construction. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law: Finding VI and VIII and Conclusion II 
( 2)) . 
Jim Didericksen testified that at the time Magna 
requested plaintiff to begin construction in the middle of the 
sewer relocation project, plaintiff requested a Change Order 
which Magna's agent attempted to procure (R. 831). Thereafter, 
defendant's agent. Robert Emerson. told plaintiff that drawings 
would be forthcoming which would alleviate the conflict and 
that plaintiff could begin construction of the project as it 
had originally bid the project (R. 831, see exact quote in 
Point One above). As work progressed it became clear that 
the attempt of Templeton to avoid the conflict had not succeed-
ed, (R. 552) and Templeton at the request of the plaintiff 
again attempted to obtain permission to issue a Change Order 
(Exh. 16-P). Nowhere in this chain of events did plaintiff 
agree to undertake construction of the changed portion of the 
Project without written authorization from Magna. 
Appellant, however, seems to argue that plaintiff 
had a duty to immediately rescind the contract upon discovering 
the possible conflict and cites the case of Herwits v. David K. 
Richards Como~. 20 U.2d 232. 436 P.2d 749 (Utah 1968) in 
support of that proposition. The Herwits case, however, is an 
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anticipatory breac~ case and therefore is not anplicable here 
In the nresent case, as Exhibit 16-P demonstrates, Magna did not 
unequivocally reject plaintiff's request for a Change Order 
On November 27th, Magn 's agent took action to procure a Change 
Order (Exh. 16-P). Plaintiff was not put to the election to 
shut down until plaintiff had reached a point in construction 
where it could no longer continue construction without a 
Change Order. That day came on the 27th of December. 1975. 
when plaintiff elected to discontinue work rather t~1an undertake 
the changed construction without written authorization. In the 
!:!~rwits case, the opinion reads, at Page 235: "If there had been 
an anticipatory breach Richard had three ootions available to 
him;" then the court lists the three options mentioned in the 
appellant's brief. Those options were not presented to the 
plaintiff in this case until it became clear from ~agna's 
actions that it would not issue a written order for plaintiff 
to undertake the changed construction. This became clear from 
Magna's failure to respond to plaintiff's demand for such an 
order; (Exh. 6-P) whereupon, plaintiff made the election to 
discontinue work on the contract. 
In Weber Meadowview Corporation v. Wild, 575 
P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1978). the court stated with approval 
the proposition that, "One who enters into a contract must cooper-
ate in good faith to carry out the intention the parties had in 
d " Fi"sher v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 19
74) 
mind when it was ma e . 
I v Myton Water Assoc~ In R. C. Tolman Construction Company nc. · _ 
tion, supra, the court said: 
-16-
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It is true that there is an implied 
obligation arising out of a construc-
tion contract that the person hiring the 
work to be done will cooperate with the 
contractor and will not hinder or delay 
his performance. (at 782). 
Since Magna had known of the intention of W. W. Clyde to under-
take freeway construction in the area of the sewer reloca-
tion project prior to the letting of the sewer relocation con-
tract and had failed to make that fact known to the olaintiff, 
it had, at the very least, a duty to cooperate with the contract 
by issuing Change Orders which would allow plaintiff to receive 
compensation for the extra expenses entailed in coordinating 
or avoiding the freewav construction. The trial court correctly 
ruled that Magna's failure to do so was a breach of contract. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERY CO~UTED PLAINTIFF'S 
DAMAGES. 
There can be no dispute that the proper formula 
for the computation of damages of an executory contract is 
the contract orice less the reasonable cost of completion. 
Holman v. Sorensen, supra. Wagstaff v. Remco, supra. In 
the case before the court, the plaintiff presented evidence 
to establish that the reasonable cost of completion of the 
sewer relocation project as originally bid would have produced 
a profit for the plaintiff, which plaintiff should have been 
entitled to recover as a result of Magna's breach. The trial 
court, however, found that plaintiff's evidence was not 
sufficiently certain to establish that the reasonable cost 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of completion would have been less than contract vrice for the 
balance of the proiect and therefore awarded vlaintiff no lost 
profit. The court, however, did award the plaintiff the contract 
price for the portion of the project alreadv comvleted in the 
sum of $24,969.00 plus interest, a finding 1vhich the aooellant 
apparentlv does not contest. 
In the case of Keller v. Deseret Mortuarv 
Company, 23 U.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 (1979), the court and oarties 
conceded that the non-breaching oarty was entitled to recover 
the reasonable value of the work oerforDed and the materials 
furnished. The court stated the general rule as follows: 
The assessment of damages by the trial 
court was consistent with the general 
orincioal which underlies the ascertain-
ment of damages for breach of contract. 
That the non-breaching partv should 
receive an award which will out him in 
as good a position as he would have been 
in had there been no breach. (at 3) 
Under the standard of the Keller case, the non-breaching partv 
(plaintiff) would be entitled to the contract orice for the com-
pleted portion of the contract, the plaintiff having alreadv 
incurred the cost of completion. Plaintiff would also be entitled 
to the contract price for the uncompleted oortion of the con-
tract less the reasonable cost of completion. The trial court's 
finding that plaintiff's evidence was not sufficientlv certain 
to establish a difference between the contract price and the 
reasonable cost of comoletion of the executor:1 portion of the 
contract should not in any wav deprive the olaintiff of the 
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benefit of its bargain for the portion of the contract comple-
ted. 
It is clear that the trial court made no finding as 
to the reasonable cost of completion of the contract. Apnellant 
asks the Sunreme Court to find,however,that the reasonable 
cost of completion is the sum paid by Magna to its contractor, 
Tuft, after August 1976 for the completion of the newly aligned 
project. As Exhibit 9-D (Appendix A) clearly shows, the 
sewer line constructed by Tuft was not the one bid upon the 
plaintiff. The mere fact that Tuft's contract was let one 
year after plaintiff's contract is enough to disqualify it 
as an indication of the reasonable costs of completion, in 
light of the historical inflation in the cost of materials 
and labor. There is no evidence in the record to establish 
that the sewer line constructed by Tuft is similar to the 
one bid upon by the plaintiff either in time, terms, or 
surrounding circumstance. Finally, the Supreme Court is 
not the proper court to make a finding of fact in a contract 
case (~~v. Stockdale and Company, 570 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1977). 
Appellant is asking this court to impose upon 
plaintiff the same damages which would have been imposed had 
the trial court found plaintiff to be the breaching party. 
Since plaintiff is the innocent party, it should receive, at 
the very least, the contract price of the materials and services 
actually rendered which is exactly what the trial court has 
awarded. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is ample evidence in the record to sunnort the 
findings of the trial court that Magna failed to make tilTlelv 
progress payments in breach of its contractual obligation and 
that MaE>,na failed to inform plaintiff of the freewav construction 
which would conflict with plaintiff's contract and failed to 
issue ulaintiff a change order to allow plaintiff to coordinate 
with, or avoid said construction all in breach of Magna's 
contractual obligations, which breach justified plaintiff in 
terminating the contract. The trial court awarded Plaintiff 
the contract price for the materials and services actuallv 
provided to Magna bv the plaintiff and plaintiff respectfullv 
submits that as the innocent partv nlaintiff is entitled to that 
measure of damages. 
DATED this~~~ dav of ~ ' 1979. 
~.~2£:i#J 
KING AND PETERSON 
Attornev for Respondent 
Suite 205 Sentinel Building 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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